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Abstract
The large number of signature States together with the current speed of ratification from various regions of the world seems to indicate the general acceptance of the treaty; many of the
problems first identified have since been clarified and resolved. It seems reasonable to expect the
Rome Statute to come into operation as early as next summer. While it is necessary to ensure effective criminal investigation and prosecution to counter serious human rights violations, we need
also to develop additional ways and means for addressing the root causes that led to violations
and impunity. Justice is important but justice alone cannot bring peace. We need both justice and
peace.
Criminal prosecution through courts and tribunals will not and cannot suit all situations, bring
justice to all, or, still less, end all conflicts. Accountability and criminal responsibility are important and necessary. But the tribunals cannot deal adequately when massive cases are involved.
Massive trials require large resources and are time-consuming, particularly when there are large
numbers of defendants. In recent years, various measures of accountability have been employed
for managing situations involving past serious violations of human rights. These measures include
acknowledging and publicizing responsibility through truth commissions, dismissing or suspending officials connected with the abuses of the previous regimes, seizure of property and assets of
the perpetrators, blocking financial sources of rogue organizations, and compensation for victims
and their families. All these are intended to demonstrate that a sense of sanctions has been applied
to misdeeds, though such sanctions may not be sufficient in all cases. The parties concerned must
work out by themselves the best solution to suit their need.
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INTRODUCTION
When the International Criminal Court ("ICC") Statute'
was adopted at Rome in July 1998, seven States voted against it
and some twenty States abstained. Barely twenty-two months
later, the two implementing instruments-the Elements of
Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence-were
adopted enthusiastically with full'consensus. No vote was necessary, in spite of numerous conflicting proposals and difficult negotiations.2 This signifies not only the acceptability of the instruments themselves, but also the good will and general support
which have since emerged after Rome both at the national and
international level. States had more time to study the Statute
and to digest its full implications. The large number of signature States together with the current speed of ratification from
various regions of the world seems to indicate the general acceptance of the treaty; many of the problems first identified have
since been clarified and resolved. It seems reasonable to expect
the Rome Statute to come into operation as early as next summer.
While the elapsed time is still short, it is not prermature to
assess what the Rome Statute has so far achieved.
I. HALF A CENTURY'S EFFORT
The creation of an international criminal court is about enforcement of law and punishment of criminals. Both subjects
are carefully guarded national prerogatives. States have inher* Ph.D., Special Senior Fellow, United Nations Institute for Training and Research; Executive Secretary, Rome Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/contents.htm
[hereinafter
Rome Statute].
2. For the legislative and negotiating history of the Statute and the two companion
instruments, see respectively, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS 657 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT], and THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS
OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 857 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter ELEMENTS AND RULES].
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ent rights to punish anyone who has committed a crime within
their territory and most constitutions also claim exclusive jurisdiction over their own nationals, regardless of where the crime
was committed. For the longest time, it was generally believed
that an international tribunal would require national courts to
give up some of their jurisdiction and States would have to concede a part of their sovereignty and to allow their nationals to be
judged and sentenced by foreigners. It was therefore not surprising that for nearly fifty years, States had resisted the idea of
having an international criminal court.
While it was possible in late 1948 for the General Assembly
of the United Nations to adopt the Convention for the Prevention and Prohibition of the Crime of Genocide' ("Genocide
Convention") and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,4
the draft instrument for an international criminal court was postponed for further study. It was then shelved, in spite of renewed
interest and numerous attempts to create such a court.
The 1998 Rome Conference succeeded in creating an international criminal justice system without directly infringing upon
national sovereignty.' The angle taken was that international jurisdiction might be justified when a State was unwilling or unable
to exercise its jurisdiction. In the former case, the decision
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction would continue to remain
with the State concerned. In such a case, the new court would
serve primarily to encourage national courts to exercise jurisdiction. In the latter case involving a failed State, the question of
3. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260A (III), (1948) U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
p.genoci.htm.
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/180,
(1948), available at http://www.un.org/overview.rights.html.
5. It may also be recalled that in the late 1980s, there was an urgent need to find
ways to combat illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs across national frontiers. The issue
was referred to the International Law Commission ("ILC") for study in the context of
the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, which the ILC had
been studying since 1947. Some opponents to international jurisdiction had harbored
the thought that the matter might be consumed under the study of the draft Code. In
1994, the ILC, which is an expert body of jurists, proposed in its draft statute that the
international criminal court was intended "to be complementary to national criminal
justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or ineffective."
Draft article 35 then set out the grounds for the admissibility of cases before the court.
This paved a way in the Preparatory Committee a year later to further develop the idea
and to build the system around this concept.
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sovereignty would hardly be an issue; the new court would be
there to fill an important vacuum. Many States found this angle
acceptable and attractive since their courts and tribunals would
continue to enjoy priority over the international court.6
To find this angle is by no means easy. To create the international justice system as embodied in the Rome Statute entailed
complex and delicate negotiations involving the entire community of States. Delegates know their own criminal system best
and all anxiously wanted to inject their own system into the
world system as much as possible. The construction of the world
system became a necessary fusion of the very different concepts
and approaches. The conference leadership provided the required leadership and great negotiation skills in merging the
principal features from all the major systems. In spite of relentless effort to harmonize the differences, inconsistencies and gaps
do exist, which is perhaps inevitable in building an international
system. Thanks to the subsequent elaboration of the Elements
of the Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, many of
the defects have been repaired.7
Under the leadership of Mr. Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretariat worked closely with the Bureau and delegates of
the Conference, which contributed to the far-sighted, efficient
work program that paved the way for a successful conference.
The heart-warming support and tireless efforts of the coalition of
over one thousand non-governmental organizations contribute
to the making of the Statute and its subsequent development.

6. The Preparatory Committee that was subsequently created to work on the
court's draft statute on the basis of the ILC text, used the principle of complementarity
to describe this newly proposed role for an international criminal court. While an acceptable approach seemed to have emerged, it was a difficult task to precisely define
the conditions and circumstances under which the international court be allowed to
exercise jurisdiction. The negotiation on the establishment of the new court was
greatly facilitated once the court's role was clarified. For legislative and negotiating
history on this issue, see John Holmes, The Principleof Complementarity, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 2, at 41-78. For subsequent negotiating history on the
relevant rules, see John Holmes, Jurisdictionand Admissibility, in ELEMENTS AND RULES,
supra note 2, at 321-48.
7. See Silvia A. Fernndez de Gurmendi, Elaborationof the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 2, at 235-57; Darryl Robinson & Herman von
Hebel, Reflections on the Elements of Crimes, in ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note 2, at 215334.
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II. ENFORCING THE LAW AND BRINGING
PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE
The coming into existence of the Rome Statute in 1998 not
only materialized a dream that had long been desired; it more
importantly brought enforcement to international criminal law
and international humanitarian law. While we have numerous
rules and laws protecting civilians, regulating the treatment of
prisoners and prohibiting the use of certain weapons and instruments, they have rarely been enforced and violators have hardly
been punished. As injuries remain un-redressed, wounds fester
and conflicts continue to erupt. A cycle of violence thus persists.
Retribution against an entire ethnic, religious, or political group
provides no solution, and often .produces further cycles of violence. Criminal prosecution serves the important purpose of
holding individuals accountable for, their acts. Decisions from
an impartial court holding the individuals responsible provide a
public, judicial confirmation of the facts, and give victims and
society in general a sense that grievances have been addressed.
The manifest interest in recent years in the creation of international criminal courts and tribunals recognizes and underscores
this need.
Many of the customary rules and laws are now embodied in
the Rome Statute and will become enforceable when the new
court comes into operation.
For the first time in history, crimes involving sexual and
gender violence have been recognized and codified under the
Rome Statute as self-standing crimes. Specially formulated rules
regarding evidence, witness protection, testimony, and trial have
also been developed to reflect the characteristics of such crimes
and to provide efficient application without in any way infringing upon the rights of the accused. There will also be institutional support to victims through the Victims and Witnesses
Unit. In all, the area of victim protection and participation has
been greatly expanded and developed.
Also for the first time in history, there will be an independent international Prosecutor to conduct investigations and
prosecutions. Concomitantly, there are also built-in checks and
balances to make sure that this independent right will be neither
misused nor unused. A Pre-Trial Chamber consisting of three
judges is entrusted with the task of supervision. The Prosecutor
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must first seek the confirmation of the Pre-Trial Chamber before
proceeding to an investigation of an alleged crime. An accused
or a suspect, or the State concerned, has a right to challenge the
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility'of a case.
The 1998 Rome Statute together with its two companion instruments-the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence-constitute the most comprehensive modern international criminal justice system to date. This system is built
on legal traditions from around the world, and contains timehonored values and concepts derived from national systems of
many countries. It belongs to no particular system of law, and
yet it is drawn from all and for all.
The two companion instruments will bring consistency, clarification, and precision to the interpretation and application of
each of the crimes under the jurisdiction of the court. Outworn
formulations inherited from treaties of the nineteenth century
have also been given current meaning and up-to-date expression.' Legal certainty will further enhance the Court's independent role, yet curb its latitude to act or not to act inconsistently
with the Statute. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which
underpin the statutory provisions, harmonize inconsistencies, fill
procedural gaps in the Statute, and clarify the inter-relationships
of all the parties involved in the proceedings before the Court,
will thus ensure the proper and effective functioning of the
Court. Current case law established by the other international
criminal tribunals has also been taken into account. All these
important attributes should enhance the Court's efficient functioning and its acceptance on a universal basis.
How effective a role that the Court may play will depend on
the attitude of the States Parties, the Security Council, and the
Prosecutor, as they have the exclusive power to trigger the process of an investigation and prosecution before the Court. It appears that States Parties and the Security Council would weigh
various political factors before making a decision. While the
Prosecutor would have independent power of investigation, his
decision would be subject to the approval of a three-judge panel.
8. Among the outstanding examples of such qualities attained may be mentioned
the elements specified respectively for the crimes of enforced disappearance, other inhumane acts, sexual violence, enforced sterilization, persecution, and transfer of civilian population. See Robinson & Hebel, supra note 7, at 224-26.
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The trend of creating courts and tribunals seems to have
spurred popular developments at the national level discernible
in various parts of the world. Shortly after the adoption of the
Rome Statute, a Spanish court indicted General Augusto Pinochet for human rights violations committed in Chile in the
1970s and demanded that the United Kingdom extradite him
while he was there seeking medical treatment.9 Although the
House of Lords eventually refused extradition and General Pinochet was allowed to return home, he has since been under
house arrest and is now being prosecuted in Chile."
A Belgian law of 1993 now asserts universal jurisdiction over
such serious crimes as genocide and crimes against humanity
and allows the nation's courts to hear cases of past atrocities that
happened anywhere, without any connection to Belgium. Four
Rwandan Hutu were tried in Belgium under this law on charges
of complicity in the 1994 State-organized genocide which
claimed the lives of more than half a million ethnic Tutsi in
Rwanda. 1 This is the first time civilians of one country are being asked to judge persons accused of war crimes committed in
another country and against people of another country. Cases
of massacres, torture, and' other horrors have also poured in
from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East charging against more
than a dozen present or past leaders of Cuba, Iraq, Israel, Ivory
Coast, Rwanda, Cambodia, Chad, Iran, and Guatemala. While
proponents of universal jurisdiction welcome this development,
many are concerned that this could overload the Belgian system
and even bring political and diplomatic embarrassment to the
government.
In addition, mechanisms for criminal prosecution are also
under way in Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. Indeed,
the search for some form of accountability of the past in the former Yugoslavia, and the initiation of criminal investigation of
past events in the Philippines, Indonesia, Peru, and other countries, may well illustrate this point. The existence of the ICC regime is therefore likely to encourage national courts to investi9. See Warren Hoge, After 16 Months of House Arrest, Pinochet Quits England, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at A6.
10. See Clifford Krauss, Freed Britain, Pinochet is Facing a Battle at Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2000, at Al.
11. See FourRwandans Suspected in 1994 Rwandan Genocide to Stand Trial in Brussels,
AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 13, 2001.
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gate and prosecute heinous crimes committed by their nationals
or within their territory.
For all these reasons, the ICC is therefore a great achievement of the twentieth century.
III. SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ACTS CONSTITUTING
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
International terrorism was not considered as a core crime
by the majority of the participating States at the Rome Conference and was therefore not embodied in the Rome Statute. The
Conference recommended that it should be included upon further consideration. 2 Be that as it may, this does not mean that
terrorist acts could not come under the jurisdiction of the ICC,
provided that such acts would meet the required elements of the
specific crime under the Statute.
It seems that the September 11 terrorist acts could constitute a crime against humanity of murder within the meaning of
article 7(1) (a) of the Rome Statute.' 3 This submission is based
on the facts as reported in the news media and on the required
elements specified for that crime: (i) over three thousand persons were killed as a result of the acts of September 11; (ii) the
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts appears to be
committed as part of a wide or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population in the Twin Towers; (iii) the perpetrators
seemed to know that the conduct was part of or intended the
conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against
such civilian population; (iv) the requirement of "attack directed
against a civilian population" does not have to be a military at12. India, Sri Lanka, Algeria, and Turkey proposed at the Conference to include
the act of terrorism in the definition of the crimes against humanity, but the proposal
did not attract sufficient support. The Conference adopted a resolution recommending that a future review conference consider the crimes of terrorism and drug
crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list
of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The principal reasons advanced for exclusion included that there was no agreed definition to these crimes which in any event
were of a character distinct from those of war crimes and genocide; the danger of overburdening the court in the absence of an agreed definition; and that they were effectively dealt with under existing international cooperation. For further details, see Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 2, at 79-81, 85-87.
13. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (1)(a).
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tack;14 and (v) the multiple commission of acts
pursuant to or in furtherance of an organizational
mit such attack. 5 How to bring this crime before
and legal issues,
would involve complex political
16
question of non-retroactivity.

seemed to be
policy to comthe new court
including the

IV. NOT AN ARBITRARY SYSTEM
The new system is carefully and precisely defined to avoid
arbitrary arrest and prosecution of national officials and military
personnel. A fully articulated system was constructed through a
combination of measures. First, the new court's jurisdiction is
limited to the most egregious crimes-genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, leaving most
other crimes under the jurisdiction of national courts. Such
crimes are subject to high thresholds: only crimes of extensive
scale committed under specially defined circumstances may
come before the Court. But even in such limited cases, if national courts choose to exercise jurisdiction, they will continue
to have priority over these crimes, as the principle of complementary will apply. The ICC cannot step in. Second, each of the
prosecutable crimes is defined in precise and concrete terms.
Specific material, mental, and contextual elements have also
been painstakingly developed for each of the crimes, creating a
closely-knit system making it difficult for anyone to go beyond
the intended scope. Third, eleven specific general criminal law
principles and some seventy procedural provisions have been included in the Statute to guide future application. More detailed
rules of procedures and evidence were subsequently developed
to further supplement the statutory provisions. All these were
intended to provide a clearly defined system and to prevent the
Court from going beyond the regime prescribed for it.
Numerous safeguards were also incorporated into the
Court's Statute and Rules to limit the Prosecutor's power, to defeat any false charges, and to prevent political maneuvering.
14. Id. art. 7(1); see also, Darryl Robinson, The Context of Crimes Against Humanity, in
ELEMENTS AND RULES, supra note

2, at 74.

15. See Report of the Preparatory Commissionfor the InternationalCriminal Court, Finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1
(Nov. 2, 2000), art. 7, introduction, para. 3. For further explanation, see Robinson,
supra note 14, at 61-80.
16. See infra Part VII.
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States would also be able to protect their national security interests by invoking a special process for handling sensitive information or documents. Events occurring before the entry into force
of the treaty are thus excluded from the Court's jurisdiction.
The possibility of abuse of power has therefore been reduced to
the very minimum. The fact that 139 States signed the Statute
within a short period testifies that one of their chief concerns
had been met.
This approach of a fully articulated regime departs from the
practice established under the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda where only
skeletal definitions of crimes were included in the respective statutes and the tribunals were entrusted with the power to develop
the necessary elements of crimes and to implement rules and
regulations. But this time, since the Court's jurisdiction will apply in the States parties themselves, they chose to build by themselves a fully articulated regime leaving little or no room for arbitrary decisions.
This rather specific and limited regime created for the new
Court may be a disappointment to those who favored a supranational system to override national systems. But the reality is that
States still want to preserve their traditional jurisdiction as much
as possible. Many of them would have rejected the Rome Statute
had the role of the Court been made broader than it is. The
Rome Statute strikes the optimum acceptable to States in the
present circumstances.
V. HIGHEST INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
When the creation of an international criminal court was
first conceived, the focus was to build an effective prosecution
and punishment regime. The Rome Statute and its companion
instruments ended with the highest international standards of
justice and guarantees of due process and fair trial to all persons
before it, regardless of their nationality or legal status. The principle that the world community established is that even perpetrators of the most heinous crimes should be entitled to all the
guarantees of fair trial and human rights. It is also important
that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done.
Besides, full trials also serve to condemn the crime and admon-
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ish future commission. The established standards mirror and
often exceed the rights and protection contained in many national constitutions. In addition, the punishment regime so created is fully consistent with current requirements of human
rights and embraces restorative and compensatory measuresfeatures that are even new to many national systems.
In fact, persons under investigation or indictment will be
entitled to more expansive human rights protection than those
traditionally accorded under universal human rights instruments. Workable rules have also now been developed for the
assignment, appointment, and qualification of legal assistance,
thus enabling the accused to choose qualified counsel to protect
his or her rights under the Statute. The accused will also be entitled to compensation for wrongful arrest or detention. This is
the best international system for the defense that has been built
so far, and is more transparent and advanced than many national justice systems.
The State of the accused has a right to challenge jurisdiction of the Court before an impartial chamber and to participate
fully in the proceedings to assist the accused. Not only the States
parties but also the non-party States are entitled to such rights of
challenges and full participation on equal footing. This is a gift
to non-party States and is rare in treaty making. States can claim
such privileges without assuming the necessary corresponding
obligations as parties to the treaty. The principle that the framers intended to establish was transparency and openness of the
proceedings to all interested parties. It was believed that no assistance to the accused should be denied.
Any courts and tribunals with lesser standards would thus be
a regression of what has so far been achieved. The White
House's November order to try suspected terrorists in military
tribunals with standards inconsistent with the ICC, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols must there17
fore be treated with serious apprehension and regrets.
17. The November order included the following features: to operate largely in
secret, a two-thirds majority of presiding officers sentencing defendants to death, decision being final with no appeal, and assigned legal assistance but not subject to the
choice of the defendant. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of the United
States, President Issues Military Order (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html.
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM FOR THE PROTECTION
OF PEA CEKEEPERS
Many of the seventy or so countries actively participating in
U.N. peacekeeping missions-will have an added advantage to becoming a party to the ICC. It cannot be excluded that soldiers
taking part in peacekeeping might fall into the hands of insurgent or rebel groups during such missions. How they can be
better protected under such circumstance is therefore an important question.
These soldiers are protected by immunities in the host
country of the mission on the basis of the U.N. status-of-forces
agreements. The government that sent the troops legally retains
criminal jurisdiction over their soldiers and they are subject to
the jurisdiction of the host government. But the status-of-forces
agreements are inoperative if they are captured by the opposing
groups and, still worse, accused of war crimes, justified or not. It
would be almost impossible to extradite them to the home country when they are beyond the reach of the host government. At
best, they may be tried by a rebel court, where their civil and
human rights may be ignored. The States concerned would be
unable to assist the soldiers in the proceedings either. While it
might be possible to have their soldiers extradited to a third
country for trial, it is extremely difficult to negotiate such a deal,
as the protracted Lockerbie case demonstrated. The ICC being an
independent international tribunal might be an acceptable alternative to a third State and may serve as a way out for such groups
in such situations.
Before the ICC, their soldiers would have, as already mentioned, legal protections as extensive as those provided in many
of the constitutions and the government of the accused would
have extensive rights to challenge the admissibility of the case
and to assist the accused in the proceedings.
In addition, the final decision whether to proceed before
the ICC ultimately rests with the government concerned.
Should it decide to do so, it could request the host country to
refer the case to the ICC. The host country could not make a
referral to the ICC without the government's consent because
the ICC is prohibited from seeking the surrender of any servicemen from a U.N. or NATO mission unless the national govern-

2002]

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ICC STATUTE

ment has given its permission. It could also request that the Security Council make a referral to the ICC.
In sum, the coming into operation of the ICC would provide an alternative means of protection to peacekeepers, irrespective of their nationality and whether their government is a
party to the ICC. The utilization of this alternative would be left
to the government concerned to decide. They do not have to
use it if they have other alternatives. It is nevertheless a reserve.
On the assumption that the ICC would arbitrarily arrest and
prosecute American soldiers without U.S. consent, many senators and representatives in the U.S. Congress believed that measures should be taken to discourage other nations from joining
the Rome treaty and that U.S. government agencies should be
prevented from cooperating with the ICC. Draft bills to that effect were introduced and adopted. At the last minute, the joint
conference agreed to a much watered-down- version limiting its
effect to one year. As pointed out above, in the unfortunate
event that peacekeepers are captured by rebel groups, it is infinitely better for them to be transferred to the ICC than for them
to be tried by an insurgent or rebel group. Since the United
States participates in manY peacekeeping missions around the
world, it is only prudent that access to this alternative forum
should be kept open. In prohibiting U.S. agencies from cooperating with the ICC, such access is therefore foreclosed. It therefore makes no sense for the government to cut off a recourse
that the peacekeeping soldiers might need for their protection.
VII. A TOOL FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The Security Council is one of the entities empowered to
refer to the Court a "situation"1 8 in which one or more of the
crimes under the Statute appears to have been committed. The
intention was to remove the need for' the creation of ad hoc tribunals in the future, as had been done in the case of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
18. The word "situation" was chosen in stead of specific "case" or "matter" in order
to preserve the court's independence in the exercise of its jurisdiction and to leave the
bringing of individual prosecutions to the discretion of the Court based on investigations carried out pursuant to the referral. For legislative'history of this issue, see Lionel
Yee, The InternationalCriminal Court and the Security iCouncil: Article 13(b) and 16, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 2, at 143-52.
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("ICTR"). But since the referral is tied to the enforcement
power of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter which binds all members of the Organization, the Security Council can therefore use this right of referral as an instrument for managing crisis as it did for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda.
Thus the Court can serve the functions of any future ad hoc
tribunals that the Security Council may decide to establish, and
the Court will be able to act immediately in such circumstances.
In the case of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, large expenditures and several years were needed to create the necessary institutional framework for those ad hoc tribunals. Once the ICC exists, the Security Council may simply refer the matter to the
Court instead of creating an ad hoc tribunal. Not only will resources be saved, but the Security Council's decision can also be
given immediate effect. For purposes of investigation and preserving evidence, such timing is extremely important.
Questions may be raised as to whether the non-retroactivity
provisions of the Statute that limit the Court's jurisdiction to
crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute should
also apply to referrals of the Security Council. The legislative
history shows that such provisions were included for strong political reasons: inter alia, to avoid creating difficulties for many
States that in the recent past "had to resort to amnesties or similar solutions to achieve national reconciliation."19 Criminal responsibility under the Statute might unravel the status quo already reached. Such States might therefore be reluctant to accept the Statute if the past would not be excluded. Recognizing
that the court cannot have jurisdiction in cases submitted by the
prosecutor or referred to it from a State party unless States are
willing to become parties in the first place, the principle of nonretroactivity was therefore necessary.
The referral by the Security Council is however something
very different. The Council would have to make decisions under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter as an enforcement action for
the maintenance of international peace and security. The creation of the ICTY and ICTR was based on this decision and the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has confirmed that the Council is
19. Per Saland, InternationalCriminal Law Principles, in
COURT,

INTERNATIONAL

supra note 2, at 196. For the negotiating history, see id. at 196-97.

CRIMINAL
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empowered and competent to set up tribunals for such purposes.2" The referral to the ICC in such cases would confer
upon the Court the competence to act as an ad hoc tribunal. As
such, the effect of the Security Council's decision would be binding on all member States, whether or not they are parties to the
Statute. Consequently, the principle of non-retroactivity is irrelevant for the purpose of maintenance of international peace and
security. It should therefore not apply.
This argument is supported by another provision in the Statute that allows the Security Council to request, under article 16,
the court not to commence or proceed with an investigation or
prosecution when the Council takes an affirmative decision in
that regard. All these provisions are linked and intended to reflect the political functions of the Security Council. A strong argument can therefore be made that the non-retroactivity provisions should not apply in the case of a Security Council referral.
Ultimately, the Court itself should decide how it should handle
such a situation.
Thousands of prisoners with different nationalities have
been captured both inside and outside Afghanistan by the U.S.
led coalition against the Taliban and Al Quaeda group. Presumably, some of them might be charged with war crimes or crimes
against humanity. In view of the "international characteristics"
that would be involved, it would seem best for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over such cases. Such trials by the ICC would
demonstrate the spirit of coalition, give international legitimacy,
and avoid criticism about below-the-standards military tribunals.
It would also provide a dossier for the new court that is expected
to come into operation soon. Legally speaking, any member of
the coalition, including the United Kingdom, that are also parties to the Statute, or the Security Council could make a referral
to the ICC. But for various political considerations, none of
such options would seem to be possible. The hostile attitude of
the U.S. Congress towards the ICC is likely to discourage the coalition members from doing so. A referral from the Security

20. The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in the Tadic case confirmed the validity of the creation by the Security Council of the Tribunal pursuant to its powers under Chapter VII. For report of the case, see
35 I.L.M. 32 (1996), paras. 28-48 and 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997), paras. 1-12.
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Council, which is subject to veto, might also be difficult in view
of the likely U.S. position in the Council.
VIII. A TOOL TO DEAL WITH. WARLORDS AND REBELS
The Rome Statute establishes a code of conduct for all, irrespective of the legal status of the actor, may it be the government
in power, warlords, dictators, rebels, or any other military or
paramilitary forces. Genocide and crimes against humanity
would apply to any prohibited acts defined in the Statute,
whether committed in peacetime or during armed conflict. Serious violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict would
also apply to protracted fighting between governmental authorities and organized armed groups, or "between such groups." Internal situations involving serious crimes committed by persons or
groups not under a government's defacto control can thus also
be referred to the Court by the State concerned. Such a referral
would enable the ICC to investigate and prosecute, placing such
persons or groups directly under the scrutiny and supervision of
an international body that may exert pressure and impose sanctions. Thus, in certain circumstances and in the absence of alter-'
natives, the government concerned may choose to rely on the
ICC to handle an internal situation as a tool for crisis management. It could help the government to combat abuses and serious violations by warlords and military groups within the State
itself. The fact is that most atrocities and abuses during recent
decades have been internal amongst various warring factions
and groups, and thus the ICC might be employed to play a role.
As a powerful international instrument for investigation, prosecution, trial, and punishment, the Court can bring international
pressure and condemnation to bear on would-be perpetrators
and thus serve to constrain their behavior.
CONCLUSION
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security Council has served a political goal to constrain the opposing parties forcing them to reconciliation. But that creation has inspired the setting up of a
series of courts and tribunals and prompted the investigation
and prosecution of criminal acts at both the national and international level. This trend should indeed be welcomed. The no-
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tion of individual criminal responsibility is now well established
and can also be enforced under specific conditions. No doubt
this must be a landmark achievement in recent history.
Encouraging signs of universal jurisdiction are also emerging and should be welcomed.
Criminal prosecution through courts and tribunals will not
and cannot suit all situations, bring justice to all, or, still less, end
all conflicts. Accountability and criminal responsibility are important and necessary. But the tribunals cannot deal adequately
when massive cases are involved. Massive trials require large resources and are time-consuming, particularly when there are
large numbers of defendants. Rwanda is a chilling demonstration. Eight years after the genocide and six years after prosecutions at both national and international level, more than ninetyfive percent of the prisoners are still waiting for trials in far overcrowded detention centers. At the current rate, it is likely to
take a century to complete the trials.2 1 More prisoners have died
in jail than are tried. Criminal management together with other
measures to expedite the process seems to be desperately
needed.
In recent years, various measures of accountability have
been employed for managing situations involving past serious violations of human rights. These measures include acknowledging and publicizing responsibility through truth commissions,
dismissing or suspending officials connected with the abuses of
the previous regimes, seizure of property and assets of the perpetrators, blocking financial sources of rogue organizations, and
compensation for victims and their families. All these are intended to demonstrate that a sense of sanctions has been applied to misdeeds, though such sanctions may not be sufficient
in all cases. The parties concerned must work out by themselves
the best solution to suit their need. The outsiders are however
encouraged to suggest new methods to help them to take such a
course.
While it is necessary to ensure effective criminal investigation and prosecution to counter serious human rights violations,
21. See Peter Uvin, Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International
Community in Rwanda after the Genocide, THIRD WORD QUARTERLY, Apr. 2001, at 177-89;
Ian Martin, Hard Choices after Genocide: Human Rights and PoliticalFailures in Rwanda, in
JONATHAN MOORE, HARD CHOICES, MORAL DILEMMAS' IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
157-76 (1998).
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we need also to develop additional ways and means for addressing the root causes that led to violations and impunity. Justice is
important but justice alone cannot bring peace. We need both
justice and peace.

